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Abstract

As the Canadian state has adopted a more multicultural conception of integration, new
Canadians and ethnocultural communities have emerged as important players in Canadian
election campaigns. Foreign policy is often considered less consequential in federal election
campaigns and is thought to be less salient amongst the Canadian public. However, new
Canadians and ethnic groups consider foreign policy with importance as any policy decision can
affect their communities and country of origin. As a result, this Major Research Paper considers
the question: To what extent does foreign policy play in the ethnic outreach campaigns of
Canadian political parties? In approaching this question, this paper reviews the foreign policy
commitments the Federal Conservative and Liberal parties of Canada have made throughout
their election campaigns from 2008-2019 and then compares those with the more recent 2021
Canadian Federal Election. In doing so, this Major Research Paper makes three central claims:
First, I expect to see foreign policy be a major factor in ethnic group voting as these
communities tend to display and develop significant attachments to international affairs due to
personal and emotional devotions. Additionally, I will argue that ethnocultural communities
should be major players in foreign policy developments as ethnic interest groups have a unique
understanding of issues abroad that domestic policymakers do not. Finally, I will demonstrate
that foreign policy has played a significant role in both Conservative and Liberal ethnic
outreach campaigns, although the Conservatives have been more explicit in their efforts. The
last claim emerges to be a prominent focus throughout as the explicit outreach efforts by the
Conservative party were shown to be crucial for the party’s success; however, as the party has
evolved since 2015, the ethnic outreach efforts may be left in the past as the party begins its new
way forward.
Keywords:
Ethnic Outreach; Ethnocultural communities; Group Politics; Interest groups; Foreign Policy;
Ethnic Targeting
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The Effect of Foreign Policy on Ethnic Outreach Campaigns:
A Canadian Case
Chapter One: Introduction:
1.1 Introduction and Structure:
Canada has labelled itself as a multicultural and diverse state comprised of multiple ethnocultural
communities. Many multicultural states (such as Canada) have begun to adopt a more multicultural
conception of integration through which ethnocultural minorities are recognized for their ethnic
identity, and the state accepts an obligation to accommodate these ethnic identities in their political
institutions and practices (Kymlicka, 2007, 72). As a result, new Canadians have become
increasingly important players in election campaigns. One-way political parties have started
accommodating ethnocultural minorities is through foreign policy initiatives. Foreign policy
represents a reasonable avenue for political parties to engage with ethnic citizens, as public opinion
has often been unreliable in international affairs as domestic citizens often care less and know little
about issues abroad (Baum and Potter, 2019, 748). To this end, political parties have adopted a
marketing strategy known as ‘ethnic outreach’ whereby different groups of voters are segmented,
and policies are targeted toward them to lure ethnic voters.
Reflecting on these developments, the purpose of this Major Research Paper is to examine
the question: To what extent does foreign policy play in the ethnic outreach campaigns of
Canadian political parties? In doing so, this paper will make the following claims: First, I expect
to see foreign policy be a major factor in ethnic group voting as these communities tend to display
and develop significant attachments to international affairs due to personal and emotional
devotions. Additionally, I will argue that ethnocultural communities should be major players in
foreign policy developments, as ethnic interest groups have unique understandings of issues abroad
that domestic policymakers do not. Finally, I will demonstrate that foreign policy has played a

pg. 4

significant role in both Conservative and Liberal ethnic outreach campaigns, although the
Conservatives have been more explicit in their efforts.
This paper will be divided into three main parts: The first will act as a literature review,
exploring scholarly work related to interest group politics – specifically focusing on ethnic interest
groups. In addition, the third chapter will examine the foundations behind political marketing
strategies such as ethnic outreach campaigns and review how ethnic interest groups can sway
policymakers to develop foreign policy commitments that meet their group’s collective interests.
The second part will conduct a case study focusing on the Federal Election campaigns of the 21st
century and compare how Canada's federal Conservative and Liberal parties have targeted ethnic
groups through foreign policy initiatives. This section seeks to illustrate how the Conservative
party of Canada under Stephen Harper and Jason Kenney gained political success by targeting
ethnocultural communities thought to have natural conservative tendencies while additionally
displaying how Liberal efforts towards ethnic outreach have followed a similar path as their
Conservative counterparts. Finally, the third part will wrap up the central foundations of this paper
and discuss the potential future direction of ethnic outreach campaigns by Canadian political
parties.
Part I
Chapter 2: Group Theory and Theories of Group Behavior
2.1 Group Politics:
Before approaching the central question of this paper, it is helpful to explore the literature that will
help explain why ethnic groups are selected for outreach campaigns. This chapter will begin by
outlining the foundations of group politics and group behaviour in addition to discussing the
politics of interest groups and how ethnic communities represent a vibrant form of interest group.
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The discussion on group politics begins through Larry Achen’s and Christopher Bartels’ book
Democracy for Realist, which stresses the failings of the ‘folk theory of democracy’ as ordinary
citizens display limited interests in politics.1 Instead, Achen and Bartels note how people are
naturally tended to form groups, which enables an “us vs them” mindset and sees group activity
directed through emotion rather than reason (Achen & Bartels, 2016, 215). In other words, group
attachments are easily orchestrated as “people are naturally group-oriented” (Achen & Bartels,
2016, 215).
The idea of group theory originates from 19th and 20th-century advancements in the social
sciences finding humans everywhere to be part of a group and consider human thought to be
primarily conditioned by cultures and sub-cultures (Achen & Bartels, 2016, 215). Influenced by
Karl Marx, who saw entire societies having their own culture, the sub-cultures evident within these
socials affect how individuals behave, what they believe, and what they value. (Achen & Bartels,
2016, 215). Marx, of course viewed sub-cultures through a class lens however these can extend
to include national, racial, religious, professional, and ethnic groups as well (Achen & Bartels,
2016, 215).
The previous paragraphs highlight the natural tendencies for groups to form in society;
however, the question now asks how these groups might affect the political landscape. The Process
of Government by Arthur F. Bentley emphasizes the importance of groups in politics. The critical
point is that groups are not just capable of pressuring governments, most individuals structure their
political thinking around their group membership (Achen & Bartels, 2016, 221). As a result, in
events such as election campaigns, groups can mobilize to benefit a particular party that meets
their interests (Achen & Bartels, 2016, 221). This claim finds further support through the Columbia

1

The folk theory of democracy is the belief system that the voting public supports, elects and embraces candidates
who reflect the collective "wishes and desires" of the people.
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scholars revealing that group membership affects vote choice; in addition, The American Voter
(Campbell et al., 1960) unveiled how voters lack stable attitudes towards major political issues as
most view politics through groups, with membership mainly driving policy preferences (Achen &
Bartels, 2016, 222-223). This can be compared with folk theories of democracy – can people busy
with their everyday lives form policy preferences, assess where candidates stand on issues, and
then select a candidate that matches their preferences—the answer more often than not is no.
Democratic citizens often display little interest in politics and public affairs and instead mainly
identify with ethnic, racial or religious groups. For most citizens, group loyalties are the primary
drivers of vote choice (Achen & Bartels, 2016, 299). This introduction from Achen and Bartels
asserts that groups are a driving factor in political decision-making. With this, the discussion shifts
into revealing how groups become significant players in the policy-making process by looking into
the habits of interest groups.

2.2 Interest Group Politics:
Interest groups are a natural occurrence in democratic systems as individuals will work
together to protect their interests (Cigler & Loomis, 2016, 2). In relation to Bentley's earlier
contributions, David Truman also places groups at the heart of politics and policymaking.
Moreover, he establishes the idea of a pluralist state where competition in and out of government
will produce “policies roughly responsive to public desires and no single set of interests will
dominate” (Cigler & Loomis, 2016, 4).2 However, the impact of interest groups and group politics
is not universally supported as some scholars suggest that citizens should not become group

“Pluralist theory assumes that within the public arena there will be countervailing centers of power within
governmental institutions and among outsiders. Competition is implicit in the notion that groups, as surrogates for
individuals, will produce products representing the diversity of opinions that might have been possible in the
individual decision days of democratic Athens.” (Cigler & Loomis, 2016, 4).
2
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members as it might be economically unwise for some people to join (Cigler & Loomis, 2016, 4).
Additionally, the pluralist vision of politics is critiqued with arguments that some groups
continuously win, as some benefit is granted to all societal interests (Cigler & Loomis, 2016, 5).
This makes group influence seem less impactful. Despite these objections, this paper continues
with the claim that groups' interests remain an impactful part of the policy-making process.
Support for this is found in Cigler’s and Loomis’ Interest Group Politics as the authors
suggest that decentralized political parties are less disciplined, which opens the potential for
“alternative political organizations such as interest groups to influence policy.” (Cigler & Loomis,
2016, 6). The relationship between groups and political parties is not entirely one-way as policies
do not only contribute to group proliferation, political parties also directly intervene in group
creation (Cigler & Loomis, 2016, 14). Group sponsorship evolved for two main reasons:
First, there is the ever-present danger that administrative agencies may exceed or abuse
their discretionary power. In this sense, the regulators need regulating. Although
legislatures have responsibility for doing this. . . the administrative bureaucracy has grown
too large for them to monitor. Therefore, citizen participation has developed as an
alternative means of monitoring government agencies. Second, government agencies are
not entirely comfortable with their discretionary power. . .. [T]o reduce the potential of
unpopular or questionable decisions, agencies frequently use citizen participation as a
means for improving, justifying, and developing support for their decisions (Cigler &
Loomis, 2016, 15).
From this, the latter point of citizen discretion appears to be particularly important as political
parties may seek to use interest groups to justify potentially controversial policy considerations.
As a result, political parties and interest groups are more closely related than thought. First, both
seek to stabilize the relationship between the public and government, and secondly, while interest
groups do not wish to hold government, they care about who does – thus, interest groups and
political parties have strong reasons to work with and shape one another (Cigler & Loomis, 2016,
194-195). In sum, groups and parties do not compete directly with each other, parties may be
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larger than groups, but groups have institutionally created advantages that allow them to navigate
behind the scenes of partisan politics (Cigler & Loomis, 2016, 214). From this, the interest group
that is the central focus of this paper is ethnic interest groups as I consider how Canadian political
parties approach the interests of ethnic communities.
Ethnic groups represent an intriguing group to study as membership in interest groups acts
as a form of social identification (Cigler & Loomis, 2016, 196). Moreover, ethnic interest groups
are a relevant research subject for both their engagement in foreign policy and their transnational
identity networks (Rytz, 2013, 15). This paper will understand ethnic interest groups as
“institutionalized non-governmental political actors whose members share a collective identity to
which belonging to the same immigrant community is central.” (Rytz, 2013, 15). This aligns with
a ‘constructivist’ vision of ethnicity by understanding ethnic groups through “imagined
transnational communities” and allowing for the mobilization of ethnic identities (Rytz, 2013, 16).
Important for discussion is differentiating ethnic communities from (1) nations and (2) diasporas.
Unlike a nation, ethnic interest groups do not claim rights over a particular territory, their primary
attachment is to the country of origin, reinforcing the understanding of ethnic communities to be
transnational rather than national (Rytz, 2013, 17). As for diasporas, which are people of a common
origin living permanently outside their homeland, this definition implies no political activity,
whereas ethnic interest groups represent political actors (Rytz, 2013, 17-18). With this
understanding of ethnic interest groups cemented, the question turns to how influential they are in
policy making.
First, it is important to ask what influence is. Some interpret it as impact, while others view
it as success. Legislators do not just respond to pressure but also design the rules of engagement
with interest groups and use them as political tools. Groups may be integrated into the policy-

pg. 9

making process to such a degree that the resulting interdependence makes it hard to discern any
external impact (Rytz, 2013, 25). To this end, the debate around ethnic interest groups' influence
over foreign policy sees one side arguing that ethnic interest groups are capturing foreign policy,
whereas the other side views ethnic interest groups as an integral part of the political system (Rytz,
2013, 28).

2.3 Chapter Conclusion
This chapter approached our question by revealing that groups are important players in the
political and policy-making process. The central claim is that groups often influence their
members' mindsets, and as a result, group loyalties often drive political decision-making. To this
end, this section advances the first argument presented in this paper as it identifies how people are
naturally group-oriented and structure their political habits around these memberships. Ethnic
groups were identified to be the interest group of major focus in this paper, and from this, we can
expect ethnic groups to be more invested in political issues abroad as members of their community
hold personal ties to their homeland and place foreign policy at the heart of their political decision
making. The next chapter will work off this and discuss the relationship between ethnic groups
and political parties, specifically around foreign policy.

Chapter Three: Ethnic Groups Outreach Campaigns:
3.1 Ethnic Outreach Campaigns:
The question this paper considers asks how important foreign policy is in ethnic outreach
campaigns – but what exactly are ethnic outreach campaigns, and why might ethnocultural
communities consider foreign policy with a greater degree of importance? This chapter begins by
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setting out approaches to ethnic outreach and how it has been applied in Canada and then
investigates why foreign policy might be important to ethnic communities during outreach
initiatives.
Ethnic outreach is a form of political marketing. Three primary forms of political marketing
exist: product-oriented-party (POP), sales-oriented-party (SOP), and market-oriented-party
(MOP). POPs mainly operate to attract voters who share a predisposed ideology, while SOPs
structures promotional activities to market themselves (Delacourt & Marland, 2009, 48). Our focus
remains on MOPs as these parties promote certain activities that align with targeted electors’
usages (Delacourt & Marland, 2009, 48). The difference is that MOPs promote ‘malleable’
products that “responds to the median voter’s preferences by demonstrating ideological flexibility”
and results in an “efficient appeal to the largest number of possible supporters” (Delacourt &
Marland, 2009, 48). The Conservatives near decade in power (2006-2015) can be attributed to the
party’s ability to influence a shift in voter preference by marketing a product that coordinated
between specific voting segments and their long-standing supporters (Delacourt & Marland, 2009,
49).3 With that, ethnic outreach follows the market-oriented approach toward political marketing
as it sees political parties – such as the Federal Conservatives and Liberals – develop flexible
policy commitments that respond to both segmented voters (ethnocultural communities) and their
long-standing supporters.
We can begin to understand the commitments of ethnic outreach campaigns through James
McCormick’s article “Democratizing Canadian Foreign Policy.” Here, McCormick stresses that
democracies such as Canada expect public organizations to respond to the demands of those they

3

The Conservatives have been labelled as being somewhere between an SOP and MOP; however, Canadian history
demonstrates that holding a marketing strategy is important to hold government, and with that, the Pearson and
Chrétien Liberals, alongside the Mulroney and Harper Conservatives, are examples highlighting how responding to
elector preferences is crucial for parties to win seats (Delacourt & Marland, 2009, 50).
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represent. These governments are evaluated on how the development of domestic policy matches
public sentiments and as a result, foreign policy is not given much attention (McCormick, 2006,
113-114). In other words, the public maintains limited interest or knowledge of foreign policy
matters, which limits their effectiveness as they cannot represent a reliable source on foreign policy
(McCormick, 2006, 114). In response to this, McCormick discusses the differences between
indirect and direct democratization.4 Direct democratization is more useful for our purposes as it
entails continuous involvement in the foreign policy process and, as a result, must include direct
consultation with government officials, engagement activities, and governmental outreach
initiatives (McCormick, 114).
The Pierre Trudeau government is often identified as kickstarting direct democratization
in regards to Canadian foreign policy as Trudeau believed there was a need to “plug people into
the decision-making process” and in effect greater public involvement began with ethnic groups
weighing in foreign policy questions, most notably through Jewish and Ukrainian communities
(McCormick, 2006 118). However, this increased involvement, or “participatory democracy” had
certain constraints attached to it as collaboration in the foreign policy realm was “based on a desire
to interest and educate Canadians rather than let their opinions determine government policy”
(McCormick, 2006, 118). Otherwise put, public opinion was more meaningful around policy
decisions Trudeau had no interest in or did not affect his core concerns (McCormick, 2006, 118).
Following this, Stephen Harper’s government campaigned under commitments to increase
direct democratization in both the foreign and domestic policy arenas. For example, the 2006
Conservative platform Stand Up for Canada called for the direct election of senators, more votes

4

Indirect democratization of foreign policy is probably the way most familiar to many observers. In this
approach, the public participates in periodic elections and determines the selection of Parliament and the
government, but only indirectly affects foreign policy, since the prime minister, cabinet, ministries, and
perhaps the Parliament decide on foreign policy actions (McCormick, 2006, 114).
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in free parliament, and enhancing the power of Parliament and parliamentary committees in
reviewing spending estimates (McCormick, 2006, 126). In the foreign policy realm, the Harper
government had largely continued the outreach efforts that had been in place before them
(McCormick, 2006, 126). Nonetheless, the latter half of the 20th century and into the 21st century
saw an uptake in direct democratization efforts when considering foreign policy matters, with the
overall aim of this effort hoping to create a culture of outreach to the public (McCormick, 2006,
127). Outreach efforts are crucial in a diverse nation such as Canada maintaining several linguistic,
regional, and ethnic differences/concerns (McCormick, 2006, 127). To this end, the Canadian state
offers a robust case study on how the public can and should be more involved in foreign policymaking. However, this does not stretch to the larger Canadian public but rather considers how
well-organized and connected civil-society groups impact the foreign policy process (McCormick,
2006, 127-128). For our purposes, this paper will move forward and consider how ethnocultural
groups in Canada have been incorporated into the policy-making process.
Ethnocultural political mobilization became a significant feature of Canadian political life
as multiculturalism was adopted into Canadian public policy and a feature of Canadian national
identity during the latter part of the 20th century (Kobayashi, 2008, 123). To this end, Audrey
Kobayashi argues that the rights of ethnocultural groups are influenced mainly by the public policy
process, suggesting that while the Charter of Rights and Freedoms along with additional legal
documents have provided a baseline, the achievement of political rights requires “a high level of
political openness and a will to action from government, the public in general, and ethnocultural
groups themselves” (Kobayashi, 2008, 123). It is well known that minority and ethnic groups in
Canada faced and continue to face challenges and constraints from the Canadian government.
Asian immigrants were brought over to be exploited for cheap production of railway lines, Black
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and African Canadians were marginalized from Canadian society for centuries, and immigrants
from Eastern and Southern European descent were designated into the lowest paying jobs (Italian
Canadians in the construction industry) (Kobayashi, 2008, 124-125). These government actions
display a clear attempt to preserve the dominance of British and French heritage as immigration
policy was constructed to establish “oppressed workers” (Kobayashi, 2008, 125).
The widespread adoption of the concept of human rights by Canadians during the second
world war fomented the recognition of minority groups and kickstarted the era of multiculturalism.
As a result, ethnocultural groups were recognized as Canada’s “third force” in political life
(Kobayashi, 2008, 127). The Canadian Ethnocultural Council (CEC) was established in the 1980s
and acted as an umbrella organization for groups of various communities and worked with the
following mission statement:
… to secure equality for of opportunity, rights and dignity for ethnocultural communities
in Canada. The CEC membership works by sharing information so as to develop a
consensus on issues of concern to its membership and by advocating for changes on behalf
of ethnic and visible minority groups (Kobayashi, 2008, 128).

The CEC became a significant lobby organization by influencing several public policy and
legislative changes during the 1980s, that not only empowered ethnocultural groups, but
additionally reached out and pushed the agenda to “mainstream” society (Kobayashi, 2008, 129).5
The CEC no longer acts as a lobbying organization and has transitioned into an “outreach
organization” that provides information to groups on health care, social services, and immigration
(Kobayashi, 2008, 142). As a result, ethnocultural communities have begun to act as their own
interest groups, which will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.

5

Some CEC members have success in doing things for themselves such as the Canadian Armenian Federation
which lobbied Ottawa on the specific purpose of encouraging the government to recognize the Armenian genocide
and received an acknowledge with Parliament classifying the genocide as a “crime against humanity” (Kobayashi,
2008, 142).

pg. 14

For now, studies on ethnic interest organizations have noted that ethnic communities – such
as Greek, Israel, Cuban, and African-American interest organizations—have been able to integrate
into North American political society and influence foreign policy directives (Singh, 2012, 340).
The common understanding of this effect suggests that group influence is dependent on the
community’s relationship with policymakers; however, Singh suggests that the impact lies in the
activities of transnational entities that have extensive networks in both their home and domestic
state:
Diaspora-based interest groups such as the Indo-Canada Chamber of Commerce (ICCC),
the Canada-India Business Council (C-IBC)1 and the Canada-India Foundation (CIF) have
lobbied the federal and provincial governments for improved relations with India to
varying degrees of success (Singh, 2012, 340).
Despite this claim from Singh, this paper will review the relationship between ethnic communities
and domestic policymakers. Nevertheless, Singh’s work is beneficial in that it reinforces the claim
that ethnic communities are powerful interest groups in the foreign policy process, not only
domestically but internationally as well.
We can see a form of widespread ethnic targeting beginning in the 2008 federal election as
Canada’s three main parties used a micro-targeting voter profile tool that outlines people's
ethnicity, social values, and income level, which is then cross-listed with the party they support
(Jiménez, 2008, 1). The demand for multicultural research tools like this one emerges from
Canadian ethnic communities gaining size and political importance; for example, immigrants are
no longer considered a clear voting bloc as all parties reach out for their support (Jiménez, 2008,
1). The Conservative Party is targeting specific ethnic groups that have assembled a “detailed
database of voters” in key ridings (Jiménez, 2008, 1). For example, suburban upscale ethnic groups
are described as recent immigrants from China, India, Pakistan, and the Philippines that have
“white collar” or service sector jobs. The usefulness of this information is to “help candidates with
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messaging, how to talk to these people, and what their core belief systems are” (Jiménez, 2008, 12). Campaigns are already structured to have a good sense of their supporters' demographics;
however, this tool allows them to go deeper and identify on a street-by-street level (Jiménez, 2008,
2). As a result, three of the five parties in Canada have begun (2008) using tools to identify and
profile ethnic voters to enhance their campaigns in battleground ridings (Jiménez, 2008, 2).
Communities that feature single group enclaves in each riding often take advice from
community leaders on a variety of topics, including who or who not to vote for (Furey, 2010, 14).
This encourages political strategists to spend significant time engaging with and attempting to
sway ethnic voters into siding with their party's platform (Furey, 2010, 14). For example, Michael
Marzolini, a/the former chief pollster, and strategist for the Liberal Party, who held a major role in
election campaigns, says, “I never recommend any courting any ethnic group above the any other
group—people know when they [are] being patronized” (Furey, 2010, 14). Marzolini also suggests
that outreach becomes more challenging to pull off the longer each group has been in Canada:
as each wave of immigration evolves, matures, and becomes absorbed into the mainstream
Canadian fabric, they are less inclined to vote homogenously – in the 1970s 80% of Italian
Canadians voted Liberal, that number has now reduced to around 58% (2010) (Furey, 2010,
14).

Columnist Angelo Persichilli firmly believes in the presence of an ethnic voting bloc, suggesting
that cultural affinities play a role in voting habits however suggests that ethnic Canadians do not
easily assemble into nested voting blocs (Furey, 2010, 14). Persichilli advocates that the best
strategy for engagement is to avoid patronizing at all costs (Furey, 2010, 15). Conservative
campaigner John Capobianco additionally sees the presence of ethnic voting blocs and advises:
Don’t only go to events or sit down with community leaders...sit down with average
voters...you have to build a relationship, build trust...never make an assumption. Don’t
assume a group is voting Liberal and thus not spend any time with them (Furey, 2010, 15).
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Capobianco additionally cites Jason Kenney’s work as the Minister of Citizenship, Immigration,
and Multiculturalism based on efforts to reach out and try to understand various communities –
which the Conservative Party of Canada is hoping will translate into electoral success (Furey,
2010, 14):
As South Asian and Asian immigration replaces European as the dominant source of new
immigrant to Canada, they bring with them different political, social, and community
values, perspectives, priorities, and experiences. Many new South Asian and Asian
immigrants feel that the Conservatives better reflect their political experience and values - Sean Hill (Furey, 2010, 15).
Nonetheless, Hill continues to believe that campaign strategies are best spent on individuals not
groups claiming ethnic voters not to be much different from general voters, “the secret is targeting
the campaign resources to attract the support from those who are predisposed or willing to consider
voting for your candidate or party” (Furey, 2010, 15).

3.2 Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy
Upon review of ethnic outreach campaigns this section delves into why foreign policy may be
important to ethnic communities when political parties structure outreach campaigns. In response
to increased levels of immigration to Canada, questions have arisen on how this will affect foreign
policymakers, specifically regarding what foreign policy priorities ethnic groups have and how
they might influence the policy-making process (Riddell-Dixon, 2008, 31). There are many factors
to consider when assessing influence with thousands of ethnic groups in Canada all differing in
their goals, membership, and access to government (Riddell-Dixon, 2008, 31-32). In the United
States (US), ethnic groups are significant players in US foreign policy (Smith, 2000, 1). This is
not surprising as the US is a purist democracy with social forces involved in policy deliberations,
such as interest groups attempting to have their concerns be given priority in foreign affairs (Smith,
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2000, 2). Despite this involvement, some oppose this collaboration between government and ethnic
communities. Two passages from Granatstein’s chapter “Multiculturalism and Canadian Foreign
Policy” kickstart our discussion: Toronto journalist Zuhair Kashmeri, who published “The Gulf
Within Canadian Arabs, Racism and the Gulf War” in 1991, argued that Canada failed to consider
“the views of its large Arab and Muslim communities before it decided to join the US-sponsored
coalition in the Gulf” (Granatstein, 2008, 79). Thought to be unacceptable, he then quoted the
views of Reverend Tad Mitsui of the United Church of Canada, who viewed race as a factor in
determining who is an enemy and who is an ally:
Canadians will never think of America as an enemy, and neither can they think of British
or the French as enemies … But it is so easy to think of Arabs as the enemy (Granatstein,
2008, 79).
Following this, political columnist John Ibbitson of the Globe and Mail, wrote in August 2005
about Canada’s governor general, Mme Michaëlle Jean, who spoke about the situation in Haiti,
where she was born, and stressed that troubles abroad are not “foreign aid issues for Canada, they
are foreign policy priorities:”
They reflect our demographic transformation, from predominantly European to truly
multinational. Problems in India and China and Haiti are our problems because India and
China and Haiti are our motherlands (Granatstein, 2008, 79).
Those arguing against ethnic influence in foreign policy deliberations suggest that
collaborative foreign policy discussions turn objectives into “policies of the heart, not policies of
the head” (Granatstein, 2008, 79). The classic opposition to involvement in foreign affairs comes
from Alexis de Tocqueville:
I have no hesitation in saying that in control of society’s foreign affairs, democratic
governments do appear decidedly inferior to others…Foreign policy does not require the
use of any of the good qualities peculiar to democracy but does demand the cultivation of
almost all those which it lacks…It has little capacity for combining measures in secret and
waiting patiently for the result…In politics, the tendency of a democracy [is] to obey its
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feelings rather than its calculations and to abandon a long-matured plan to satisfy
momentary passion (Smith, 2000, 5).
Advocates against group involvement in foreign affairs note that “foreign policy is not
about loving everyone or even helping everyone, it cannot be about doing something only to satisfy
one group’s ties to its mother country, national interests are and must be top” (Granatstein, 2008,
79). This is not to say that ethnic communities should not speak out on policy with their interests
in mind, but rather suggests a form of democratic commitment that obligates ethnic units to the
national community they are a part of (Smith, 2000, 16). Moreover, those critiquing a collaborative
foreign policy critique the actions of elected officials as well, noting that effective foreign policy
is not constructed to win support from ethnic groups and want the government to stress that those
coming into Canadian society accept the values of the Canadian public (Granatstein, 2008, 85-86).
From this, responses to the claims from Kashmeri and Ibbitson continue to stress the idea of
national interest:
understanding what our national interests are is the way to make foreign policy, rather
than pandering to opinion polls and ethnic polls. Our foreign policy must be based on
what is important to Canadians as a whole, not to Canadians wearing only their Old
Country/ethnicity religious hat. (Granatstein, 2008, 89).
Paul Martin's government … must send a zero-tolerance message to those who bring a new
country the troubles that make it so attractive to leave an old one… It will also help greatly
if our leaders can focus on the aspects of foreign policy that are important to the nation as
a whole and stop playing to ethnicities that make up our population (Granatstein, 90).
Diplomats in Canada generally argue that Canadian national interests cannot be served by
bending to the pleas from special interest groups, special pleas from groups such as Jews
about Israel is universally by the policymaking community as “damaging to national
interest (Carment & Bercuson, 2008, 207).
Despite these claims, I move to argue that input from ethnic groups should be a crucial part
of foreign policy deliberations as national interests are not always clear and identifiable. Moreover,
domestic Canadians and elected officials might not always comprehend issues abroad, and as a
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result, collaboration should be welcomed to establish a coherent understanding between ethnic
groups and policymakers.
Turning our attention to David Goldberg’s Foreign Policy and Ethnic Interest Groups
kickstarts the discussion on how ethnic groups may begin to influence foreign policy decisions.
The impact of ethnic groups on foreign policy reflects several tendencies of group behaviour. The
first of these follows the discussion held in Chapter two of this paper as Goldberg reinforces groups
to be important participants in political life with interest groups evident in all cultures and
governments (Goldberg, 1990, 2). The second tendency notes the impact organized interest groups
have upon the state’s foreign policy process – which includes all types of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) concerned with foreign policy (Goldberg, 1990, 2). Finally, the third
tendency in group behaviour acknowledges an increased appreciation for ethnicity as a foundation
for group formation and organized political action (Goldberg, 1990, 2-3). To this end, ethnicity
has become a standard component in North American politics, and as a result, scholars tend to
focus on how ethnic groups interact with those making foreign policy decisions concerning their
groups (Goldberg, 1990, 3).
With this, literature typically focuses on ethnic groups' attempts to influence foreign policy
directions, with most studies suggesting a strong relationship – direct or indirect—between ethnic
group activism and the foreign policy decisions produced by government officials (Goldberg,
1990, 3).6 The factors that most help explain ethnic interest groups' potential impact on government
foreign policy include: how the group is oriented (issue or institutionalized), how the state
structures its foreign policy decision-making system; such as the extent to which the state’s
decisional process is open to intervention from NGO actors (ethnic interest groups), and

6

Since the 1970s many studies on ethnic interest group impact of foreign policy have pointed to the pro-Israel
lobbying activities of the Jewish communities in the United States and Canada (Goldberg, 1990, 3).
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finally, the amount of attention the issue receives relative to other features of the ethnic group’s
foreign policy agenda; such as the extent to which the issue is a crisis for the group. (Goldberg,
1990, 7-10). Ethnic groups do not perceive all foreign policy issues to be of equal importance,
there is a gradation of issues, with the greater perceived issue making the group more willing to
use resources to have the government address its concern. (Goldberg, 1990, 10).
Ethnic groups typically have interests that encourage them to lobby policymakers. These
tend to include but are not limited to, immigration, with immigrants keen on bringing loved ones
to Canada and ultimately pressure the Canadian government to expand their immigration and
refugee laws (Riddell-Dixon, 2008, 34). Additional areas of focus concern expanding trade
partnerships with their country of origin, increasing aid to places of birth, and taking stances on
tense political issues occurring in their homeland (Riddell-Dixon, 2008, 34). Immigrants and
refugees come with strong emotional ties to their country of origin, and when they arrive in
Canada, they can stay informed on the situation abroad, which may encourage them to seek levels
of Canadian assistance (Riddell-Dixon, 2008, 36).7 There are two principal avenues by which
ethnic communities may exert influence in the policymaking process: (1) The electoral process
and (2) forming of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to lobby the government. First ‘The
Electoral Process’: Recent arrivals, such as immigrants and refugees often settle in geographically
concentrated areas, which increases their potential to influence electoral outcomes (Riddell-Dixon,
2008, 40). With ethnic communities being concentrated they are expected to exert influence over
political choices, mainly in the domestic realm, however, foreign policy takes priority with matters
related to immigration/refugee policy, trade deals, and international politics concerning their

7

When a tsunami struck South Asia in 2004, Asia groups were quick to lobby the Canadian government for aid to
the affected regions, in addition to working with media to generate donations towards relief efforts overseas
(Riddell-Dixon, 2008, 36).
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country of origin (Riddell-Dixon, 2008, 40). Second, ‘NGO Advocacy’: Recently, ethnic groups
have shown advanced involvement with foreign policy issues as ethnic communities now have
their own lobby groups, which act as national umbrella organizations (Riddell-Dixon, 2008, 42).
These groups are classified as ‘issue-oriented, ' which focus on narrow, short-term goals and tend
to lack internal cohesion, focus, and structure. (Riddell-Dixon, 2008, 43). However, as groups
become more established, they can advance into becoming a more institutionalized unit (RiddellDixon, 2008, 43).8
However, an additional facet of group influence is affected by its goals, the degree to which
it is perceived to be credible, its sense of timing, and its ability to court allies (Riddell-Dixon, 2008,
44). In other words, it is easier for policymakers to get a sympathetic ear when the goals align with
national interests (Riddell-Dixon, 2008, 44). As a rule, it is best to start lobbying earlier in the
process rather than waiting until after the policy has been announced as official government policy
(Riddell-Dixon, 44). With their rising numbers and growing sophistication, ethnic groups are
increasingly able to meet these internal requirements (Riddell-Dixon, 2008, 45). With this, the next
section will review literature discussing the voting habits of ethnic communities in Canada.
3.3 Ethnic Group Voting Habits
Throughout the paper so far there has been a clear discussion suggesting group membership to
impact political behaviour. From this, when considering ethnic group voting it is generally
accepted that ethnicity affects voting behaviour (Landa et al., 435). A rational model of ethnic
voting behaviour holds that ethnic voters support candidates belonging to the same ethnic group

8

Institutional: Groups with established and cohesive organized structures, permanent offices, paid staff, and stable
membership that understand the policy process and enjoy long-term relationships with relevant sectors of
government. They are often well positioned to monitor government policy and cultivate ongoing relations with key
policy makers. Issue-oriented groups focus on short-term goals and often lack the internal cohesion yet as they
become more established issue groups can develop into institutional (Riddell-Dixon, 2008, 43).
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due to the rationale that the candidate will act for the group's interest while in government (Landa
et al., 1995, 435-436). This is known to be a form of ethnic affinity voting. 9 Karen Bird et al. test
the results of ethnic affinity voting during Olivia Chow’s run as a visible minority candidate in the
2014 Toronto Mayoral election. Following the investigation, the 2014 Toronto Mayoral election
exemplified a case where “visible minorities” were more likely to support Olivia Chow (Bird et
al., 2016, 369). Additional studies in Canada support these findings, highlighting that affinity
voting patterns increased within compact ethnic minority settings (Bird et al., 2016, 364).
Nonetheless, what is most revealing from this case is that these ethnic affinity patterns were more
significant among Chinese voters than other visible minorities, showcasing ethnic Chinese voters
to be more likely to support Chow – who is of Hong Kong descent (Bird et al., 2016, 371). This
discussion on ethnic group voting habits is crucial to the study of this paper as it notes how policy
related to ethnic groups' interests is not the only factor driving ethnic group voting habits. The
presence of ethnic affinity voting further affirms the foundations of group politics suggesting group
membership to be the driving factor of political decision making. With this, moving forward into
the case study it will be interesting to see how ethnic representation unfolds as an important
outreach initiative for ethnocultural communities.

3.4 Chapter Conclusion:
In summary, this chapter established the position that ethnic groups should be essential players in
the foreign policy-making process. While the view exists that foreign policy should solely center
on national interests, I develop a position advocating for ethnic groups to work alongside
government and policymakers as they can deliver unique insight into issues abroad better than

The authors here reveal that affinity voting occurs when a candidate is identified by their membership and thought
to be “acting for” the group's interest (Bird et al., 2016, 362).
9
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domestic Canadians. Additionally, this chapter highlights have ethnic groups have particular
foreign policy interests related to areas such as immigration, trade, and the politics of their country
of origin. To this end, the next section of this paper will review how ethnocultural communities
have surfaced as critical political players and been targeted by Canadian political parties during
federal election campaigns by reviewing how parties have committed to specific ethnic groups
through their foreign policy proposals.
Part II
Chapter 4: Canadian Party Ethnic Targeting
The previous chapter established how ethnic groups have the potential to influence foreign policy
decisions during outreach campaigns by political parties. This paper will continue to examine the
importance of foreign policy in ethnic outreach campaigns as the previous chapter discussed how
ethnic group foreign policy interests often regard immigration, trade, and political stances
involving a group's country of origin. This chapter will investigate how Canada's Conservative and
Liberal parties have targeted ethnic concerns around these topics in their election campaigns. It is
helpful to examine the manifestos of these parties over the last two decades as party platforms are
symbolic statements of party positions (Cigler & Loomis, 2016, 199). Though they might not
directly reflect each candidate’s position, they may influence the public’s perception of a party as
groups work to define an individual party’s positions (Cigler & Loomis, 2016, 199). Conversely,
others might view these statements as simply baiting for votes, with comments on Patrick Brown’s
bid for Conservative leadership suggesting that lifting the terrorist title of the LTTE is a “good
way to rustle Tamilian votes” (Ahmed, 2022).

4.1 Party Approaches to Ethnic Outreach:
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4.1 (a) Conservative Ethnic Targeting
The 2011 federal election resulted in the Conservatives winning a majority government for the
first time since merging the former Reform and Alliance party. Upon winning the election, former
Citizen and Immigration Minister Jason Kenney declared that the Conservatives were “the party
for new Canadians” as it found its new pillar of electoral support, the ethnic pillar (Carlaw, 2015,
105). The party’s ties to the Reform party originally alienated many ethnic voters due to inherited
baggage and harsh policy stances by Reform members (Carlaw, 2015, 106). Tom Flanagan
(Conservative political activist) attributes the Conservatives’ electoral success to hard work rather
than any significant policy innovations:
the patient effort of establishing contact — visits…to ethnic events; recruiting multicultural
candidates and political organizers; printing political materials in [other] languages. These,
Flanagan noted, were steps easy to enumerate, but took years to achieve” (Carlaw, 2015,
106).
Jason Kenney, former Conservative Minister of Citizen and Immigration and Alberta Premier had
long argued that the party should “show up” to the political contest following years on the sideline
and form interpersonal relationships with diverse communities (Carlaw, 2015, 107). Flanagan
notes that the Conservative's plan was not to offer a plateau of new benefits but instead to show
new Canadians that their interests would be best represented by a Conservative government
(Carlaw, 2015, 107). The Conservative party has promoted a conformist, militarist nationalism
agenda along with the rhetoric of inclusion for new and ethnic Canadians (Carlaw, 2015, 118).
Through these steps, the party had adopted aggressive outreach efforts that had helped them obtain
a “minimum winning coalition” that was large enough to receive a majority government in 2011
(Carlaw, 2015, 118).
To this end, the objective of Conservative ethnic outreach campaigns was understanding,
seducing, and attracting ethnic communities to the Conservative party — a bloc usually taken for
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granted by the Liberals — this strategy designated Kenney to be the architect of the Conservative
majority (Castonguay, 2013, 2). Kenney pitched his theory on ethnic targeting to Harper on the
basis that even with a united right (following the merger of Reform and Alliance parties)
“conservatism has peaked” (Castonguay, 2013, 3). Therefore, Kenney thought the party had to
branch out to immigrants, “look at demographic trends—it’s the future … Immigrants have the
same values as us, we have to talk to them, to convince them” Kenney said to Harper (Castonguay,
2013, 3). Harper, who was skeptical until taking power at the helm of a minority government in
2008, proposed that Kenney pursue the mission that he had defined — “prove to me that I was
wrong” (Castonguay, 2013, 3).
The ethnic outreach work by Jason Kenney had turned him into a celebrity figure. In ridings
with significant immigrant populations such as Trinity-Spadina, Kenney is noted to be welcomed
with honking horns, stopped frequently, and is as well known in the Chinese community as Justin
Bieber; Whereas in Calgary, Kenney’s home riding, he can go on for hours without being
recognized (Castonguay, 2013, 5). The Conservative outreach strategy is outlined in the document
“Breaking through: Building the Conservative brand in cultural communities” aiming toward
Chinese, Jewish, Ukrainian and South Asian communities.
If Greater Toronto’s South Asians formed their own city, it would be the third-largest city
in the country,” it read. The take-away points were neatly summed up: there are lots of
ethnic voters. There will be quite a few more soon. They live where we need to win
(Castonguay, 2013, 6).
In 2011 the Conservatives won 24/25 suburban Toronto ridings — “without the support of the
ethnic communities, we could have never done that” — and the Conservatives estimate that they
accumulated about 42% of the ethnic vote in 2011, which is 30% higher than they had in 2008
(Castonguay, 2013, 7). After the election, there were rumours that Kenney may change positions
however, when asked about that Harper said the thought never crossed his mind,
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He had too many important reforms under way, and the message sent to the cultural
communities would be all wrong. After having courted and then obtained their vote, we
take away their champion? No. (Castonguay, 2013, 7).
Having established the foundations around Conservative ethnic outreach, we can now examine
how they targeted groups through immigration, trade, and political issues related to their country
of origin.
(1) Immigration:
We can review the Conservative party’s immigration policy by revisiting the commitments
made in their party manifestos from 2008-2019. The merger of the right saw significant
transformations in the party’s immigration policy as the Conservatives felt that the immigrant and
minority vote was a crucial margin to form government as this segment had been dominated by
the Liberals for decades (Tolley, 2018, 101). Skeptics of the party’s commitments to immigration
noted the anti-immigrant rhetoric that was profound to the former Reform Party and Canadian
Alliance. Nevertheless, determined to earn the support of immigrant voters they reminded
Canadians that it was John Diefenbaker’s Tories who introduced Canada’s first Bill of Rights and
Brian Mulroney’s government who enshrined official multiculturalism in law (Tolley, 2018, 101).
To this end, upon the merger of the right, the Conservative party essentially adopted immigration
and multiculturalism into their policy agendas as they began to regard the ethnocultural
communities as an important voting bloc (Tolley, 2018, 102). Nonetheless, a review of
Conservative immigration policy during the Harper years seemingly showcases a focus on
supporting immigrants in Canada, as opposed to reunification, which Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon
notes as a central concern among immigrant group lobbyers. Examples of such commitments are
evident in the following manifestos:
1. 2008 Conservative Manifesto: A true north strong and free: Stephen Harper’s
plan for Canadians:
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•

•

•

A re-elected Conservative Government led by Stephen Harper is committed to
implementing the reforms contained in the 2008 Budget to reduce the immigration
processing backlog and to expedite applications from people with the skills and
professions most in demand in Canada. (17-18).
A re-elected Conservative Government will build on the creation of the Foreign
Credentials Referral Office to work with the provinces and territories to ensure greater
standardization of workplace and professional credentials across the country and
standards for assessment of foreign credentials and will place this issue on the agenda of
the next meeting of First Ministers. (17-18).
In order to protect immigrants and potential immigrants and their families, a re-elected
Conservative Government will make immigration consulting a regulated activity. (1718).
2. 2011 Conservative Manifesto: Here for Canada:

•
•
•
•
•

Canada is fortunate to attract hard-working immigrants from around the world, eager to
earn a better life for their families and to contribute to Canadian society (10).
But obstacles in the recognition of foreign credentials can make it hard for them to find a
suitable job. And for those who need to upgrade their skills for use in Canada, it is
difficult to qualify for existing programs or private loans (10).
Stephen Harper’s Government has invested new funds to implement a common approach
to foreign credentials recognition across Canada, and established the Foreign Credentials
Referral Office (10).
But more is needed. To build on our actions so far, we will provide loans for recent
immigrants to help pay for skills training and accreditation (10).
This new measure will make it easier for new Canadians to find jobs that take full
advantage of their experience and expertise, and help them to contribute fully to the
growth of the Canadian economy (10).
3. 2015 Conservative Manifesto: Protect our Economy

•

To ensure that newcomers succeed, while growing the Canadian economy, the
Conservative Government has made important reforms, including: (32-33)
o Moving to a fast and flexible immigration system where the priority focus is
on meeting Canada’s labour market needs.
o Creating the Canadian Experience class that invites foreign students who have
graduated from Canadian universities and colleges to stay and obtain
permanent residency.
o Radically improving the geographic distribution of immigrants across Canada,
partly by increasing the Provincial Nominee Programs by tenfold.
o Eliminating massive backlogs created by previous Liberal governments that
left aspiring Canadians waiting for years.
o Establishing a new Expression of Interest system that shifts from a passive
processing of applications to fast-tracking of applicants with jobs offers or indemand skills.
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o Reforming the Temporary Foreign Worker Program to prevent abuses, and
ensure that Canadians always get the first chance at available jobs.
o Increasing family reunification by 10%, while introducing the popular new
ten-year multiple-entry Super Visa for parents and grandparents.
o Cutting the Liberals’ right of landing fee in half, saving newcomers hundreds
of millions of dollars.
o Tripling funding for settlement services, like free language classes and job
search skills.
o Creating free pre-arrival orientation counselling for selected economic
immigrants to help them get a head start on credential recognition and finding
employment before they get to Canada.
From this, the Conservatives seemingly placed immigration as a central component of their foreign
policy under Harper; however, they appealed to immigrants with promises to improve their living
conditions in Canada instead of reunification or expansion. The dedication to immigrant voters
was most beneficial in the 2011 election as the Conservatives won a majority government after
capturing several seats in dense immigrant metropolitan areas previously dominated by the
Liberals (Taylor et al., 2012, 2). The Conservative party and many media commentators hold that
the 2011 victory stemmed from the party’s aggressive commitment to ethnic outreach as the party
attempted to lure recent immigrants from societies known for social conservative values and
therefore would be attracted to the party’s more conservative platform (Taylor et al., 2012, 2).
Upon transition to Andrew Scheer as Conservative leader, immigration policy still delivers
the narrative it did under Harper, however, it seemingly shifts and presents policy that encourages
adopting more immigrants and refugees into Canadian society:10
4. 2019 Conservative Manifesto: For You to Get Ahead
•

To support the many generous Canadians waiting to help sponsor refugees to Canada, we
will remove the annual cap on the number of sponsorship applications that can be

10

To better support new arrivals to Canada, we will continue to support settlement services for newcomers.
Language training, credential recognition, and specific services for vulnerable newcomers such as women and girls
and members of the LGBTQ+ community, are key to the successful integration of new immigrants into their new
home. A new Conservative government will preserve the integrity of our immigration system and make sure that our
immigration programs lead to newcomers being fully supported and integrated into Canadian society and Canada’s
economy (58)
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•
•

submitted. Private sponsors have told us that the government gets in their way and that
there are costs and needless red tape that restrict the good work they do. Canada’s
churches, mosques, community groups, temples, synagogues, and cultural associations
can offer so much to newcomers. So often, Canadians come together and devote their
resources of time and money to support a refugee and their family. Their compassion and
investments of time and money cannot be replicated by the government. Government
data show that even a decade after privately sponsored refugees arrive, they earn more
and depend less on government than those who come through government sponsorship. A
new Conservative government will do more to enable and support private sponsors
welcoming newcomers to Canada (56-57).
To further support sponsorship groups in the process of privately sponsoring a refugee, a
new Conservative government will reduce wait times to approve a privately sponsored
refugee by ensuring that departmental resources are sufficiently focused on PSRs (56-57).
To ensure that all individuals are well supported to integrate to society, we will prioritize
genocide survivors, LGBTQ+ refugees, and internally displaced people in the
Government-Assisted Refugees program (56-57).

The comparisons between these two policy presentations are best summed up with the Harper
Conservatives adopting a “buffet style approach” by pursuing policies that were both expansionist
and restrictionist by advocating for immigration policy in economic terms, which would be
attractive to immigrant and minority voters while at the same time not alienating their traditionally
Conservative base (Tolley, 2018, 107).11

As for the shift in immigration approach, the

Conservative's response 2015 Syrian Refugee Crisis perhaps triggered new pathways forward with
the crisis catching the public’s attention. The government was accused of inaction and callousness
with The Globe and Mail reporting that the Prime Minister’s Office had halted the processing of
Syrian refugee claims for several weeks in 2014 (Tolley, 2018, 108). To this end, the Conservatives
under Scheer might have pitched a foreign policy agenda around immigration and refugees that
targeted genocide survivors and refugees to showcase their commitments to Canadians with
immigrant/refugee backgrounds. As a result, the Conservative Government employed an ethnic

“Referring to the right of landing fee as a “head tax,” the government cut this amount in half, a move that not only
fit with their reputation as tax-cutters but also appealed to immigrant voters” (Tolley, 2018, 108).
11
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outreach strategy towards immigration policy that was targeted to appeal to ethnocultural
communities believed to have “natural” Conservative leanings (Tolley, 2018, 122).
(2) Trade
The next avenue we can examine Conservative ethnic targeting in their foreign policy is
through their commitments to trade. For example, we can see expanded trade talks in the
Conservative’s 2006 platform proposing “Canada [to be] a trading nation, and Canadian jobs
depend on our ability to pursue free and fair-trading relationships with like-minded countries
throughout the world” (Conservative Manifesto, 2006, 47). As a result, a Conservative government
would begin to “explore the possibility of free-trade negotiations with Canada’s democratic and
economic partners in the Asia-Pacific, Japan, and India” (Conservative Manifesto, 2006, 46). To
this end, Conservative trade policy over the subsequent four campaigns (2008, 2011, 2015, 2019)
was committed to exploring and expanding trade opportunities with diverse markets abroad.
Interestingly, the explored markets seemingly targeted Canadian ethnocultural communities,
specifically focusing on those from the Asia Pacific region. We can see this unfold with a review
of the Conservative party’s trade policy from 2008-2019.
1. 2008 Conservative Manifesto: A true north strong and free: Stephen Harper’s plan
for Canadians
•

•

A re-elected Conservative Government led by Stephen Harper will continue to pursue
trade agreements, such as those successfully reached with the European Free Trade
Association, Colombia, Peru and Jordan. We are committed to seeing these deals passed
by Parliament. In light of the recent setback at the World Trade Organization
negotiations, a re-elected Conservative Government will move aggressively to improve
Canada's network of bilateral and regional free trade and economic agreements (16).
To improve Canada's position as a global trader, a re-elected Conservative Government
will proceed with plans to open new trade offices in China, Mongolia, Mexico, Brazil and
India (in Hyderabad, Kolkata and Ahmedabad) (16).
2. 2011 Conservative Manifesto: Here for Canada

pg. 31

•

o To create more jobs and opportunities for Canadians, Stephen Harper’s Government
has signed new trade agreements with eight countries – Panama, Jordan, Colombia,
Peru, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland – and we are in negotiations
with many more; and made major steps forward in trade relations with China (11).
CANADA-INDIA FREE TRADE
o India – one of the world’s fastest growing and largest economies, with one billion
customers – building on the personal ties and business expertise of our large IndoCanadian community (11).
o Since taking office in 2006, Stephen Harper’s government has made it a priority
to revitalize Canada’s relationship with the great nation of India. For example, to help
Canadian businesses gain greater access
o Opened three new trade offices in India
o signed a Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement; and
o in 2010 Prime Minister Stephen Harper and India’s Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh launched negotiations on a comprehensive economic
partnership between Canada and India (11).
o We will aim to complete negotiations on a Canada-India Free Trade Agreement in
2013 (11).
3. 2015 Conservative Manifesto: Protect our Economy

•

Canada is a trading nation and we’ve made historic strides to open new markets for
Canadian businesses and their workers. The Trans-Pacific Partnership is the largest free
trade deal in history. It provides almost 800 million new customers throughout the AsiaPacific region for Canadian goods and services. Membership in this agreement is a good
deal for Canada, one that will create jobs and opportunities and protect our economy (5).
4. 2019 Conservative Manifesto: For You to Get Ahead

•

To diversify Canada’s trade toward emerging markets and reduce dependence on the US,
we will sign free trade agreements with Mercosur, ASEAN, and the UK. We will stand
up for Canada’s strategic industries and pursue opportunities for Canadian manufacturers
to increase growth and exports. (36).

The Conservative party would deny that they had taken any steps to target specific communities
directly; however, several media reports indicate that the party was specifically focusing on
Canadians with Korean, South Asian, Persian, Polish, Jamaican, Filipino, Vietnamese, Jewish, and
Chinese (particularly Cantonese) backgrounds (Tolley, 2018, 115). Moreover, several of Minister
Kenney’s speeches were targeted toward Chinese Canadian communities and advertisements
during the 2011 campaign were designed to reinforce the shared values of ethnocultural
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communities and the Conservative party held (Tolley, 2018, 115).12 From this, it becomes clear
that the Conservative party was structuring their foreign trade initiatives around specific ethnic
communities. This became another outreach strategy the Conservative party implemented in
attempts to secure ethnic votes with Prime Minister Harper getting involved as he was reported to
be the main speaker at the Indo-Canadian Chamber of Commerce in Vaughan, where he “boasted
of Canada's improved trade ties with India” (Ivison, 2008). To this end, we see the Conservative
party take specific steps to expand trade ties with regions that several Canadians have ties to.
Moreover, it appears these foreign policy positions were developed as an outreach strategy to
attract votes from ethnic communities.
(3) Political Stances
The third channel of foreign policy initiatives the government could use to target
ethnocultural communities is taking stances on political issues facing a particular group’s country
of origin. The Conservative Government under Harper placed defending human rights and
freedoms as a central component of its foreign policy:
1. 2008 Conservative Manifesto: A true north strong and free: Stephen Harper’s plan for
Canadians:
•

A re-elected Conservative Government led by Stephen Harper will make the promotion
of Canada's democratic values on the world stage a major focus of our foreign policy. We
will establish a new, non-partisan democracy promotion agency that will help emerging
democracies build democratic institutions and support peaceful democratic change in
repressive countries. (30)
2. 2011 Conservative Manifesto: Here for Canada

•

DEFENDING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (40)

12

One ad featured Nina Grewal, a member of Parliament of Sikh faith. Accompanied by images of Indo-Canadians
arriving in Canada, the voice-over notes, “For over 100 years, Indo-Canadians have worked hard to build Canada.
Things haven’t always been fair for us, but the Conservatives have always recognized our history and our
community’s sacrifice.” (Tolley, 2018, 115)
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o

Around the world vulnerable religious minorities are subject to persecution,
violence, and repression.
o Canada has a proud tradition of defending fundamental human rights, such as
freedom of religion and freedom of conscience; and our Government recognizes
that respect for religious pluralism is inextricably linked to democratic
development.
o But we can and should do more to respond to the plight of those who suffer
merely because of their faith. We will:
• Create a special office Religious Freedom in the Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade to monitor religious freedom around the
world, to promote religious freedom as a key objective of Canadian foreign
policy, and to advance policies and programs that support religious freedom;
• continue to ensure that Canada offers its protection to vulnerable religious
minorities through our generous refugee resettlement programs; and
• ensure that the Canadian International Development Agency works with
groups supporting such vulnerable minorities.
To this end, the Conservative's foreign policy style was understood as a neoconservative approach
to foreign affairs, adopting a strong sense of patriotism, rejecting forms of world government, and
distinguishing allies from enemies (Narine, 2018, 317).13 The latter point of allies from enemies
has defined Conservative foreign policy, especially concerning their politics of state recognition.
Neoconservative policies towards the Middle East are tied to the security and support of Israel,
with neoconservatives viewing Israel as the only democratic entity in the region; an approach that
was demonstrated in Harper’s foreign policy towards the region and reiterated by Scheer’s
leadership (Narine, 2018, 317).
3. 2015 Conservative Manifesto: Protect our Economy
•

We'll also continue to follow a principled foreign policy and stand up for what's right
rather than what's popular. In a dangerous and unstable world, we need a government that
recognizes risks to Canadian interests and our security and speaks with clarity. And
we’ve done that. Prime Minister Stephen Harper has been a leader on a wide range of
global issues including standing up for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression,
defending Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state and to defend itself, and speaking out
against the persecution of religious minorities and women and girls around the world.
(77)

13

Neo-conservatism holds the domestic and international sphere to a clear moral and ideological standard and
champions the use of militarism to further that standard globally (Narine, 2018, 317).
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4. 2019 Conservative Manifesto: For You to Get Ahead
•

Recognize that Jerusalem is the Capital of Israel
o To formally recognize that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, we will move the
Canadian embassy to Jerusalem. Israel is one of Canada’s strongest allies and a
beacon of pluralism and democratic principles. Israel has an inherent right to
defend itself and the right to determine where its capital is located, a right claimed
by all sovereign nations. Furthermore, we will always defend Israel’s interests at
the United Nations. (81)

Even though about 57% of the Canadian public (BBC, 2013) held negative views towards the
state of Israel, the Government’s support was never questioned; with this, by unequivocally
supporting Israel, the Conservatives successfully attracted the loyalty of many Jewish Canadians:
In the 2011 election, around 52 per cent of Jewish Canadians voted Conservative (Simpson
2011). Though fewer in number than Canadian Muslims, the Canadian Jewish community
is far better established, organized, politically engaged, and wealthier (Sasley 2011)
(Narine, 325).
To this end, the Conservative’s backing towards Israel and other countries with tense political
situations helped them gain the support of ethnocultural communities with a vested interest in the
situation abroad.14 Nonetheless, policies like the three discussed above are not the only factors that
sway ethnic and minority voters.
Ethnic outreach strategies also include candidate selection (Taylor et al., 2012, 9). As made
evident in the last chapter, representation matters to ethnic voters. As a result, the Conservatives
worked this into their ethnic outreach strategy as they began to nominate proportionality more
racial minority candidates than all other parties during the 2004 election (Tolley, 2018, 119).

14

Canada stands in solidarity with the people of Ukraine, and will continue to do so. Our position has been clear:
We will never accept Russian President Vladimir Putin's unwarranted and illegal occupation and annexation of the
Crimean Peninsula, nor his continued proxy war in other parts of eastern Ukraine; A re-elected Conservative
Government will toughen Canada’s sanctions regime by: Adding “gross human rights violations” as a new ground
for sanctions; And closing loopholes that allow sanctioned individuals to circumvent travel restrictions; These
measures will reinforce our support for the Ukrainian people in their struggle for freedom, as well as strengthen our
ability to respond to international crises, and align our sanctions regime with our broader values. They’ll also
reinforce our commitment to standing up for freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law abroad.
(Conservative Manifesto, 2015, 89-91).
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However, the party’s commitments to representation remain questioned as the number of diverse
candidates reduced significantly in the 2006, 2008, and 2011 elections (Tolley, 2018, 119).
Moreover, in 2015, the Conservatives fell short of the Liberal's commitments to diverse candidates
even with additional seats added in ethnically diverse ridings within the Greater Toronto Area to
the House of Commons (Tolley, 2018, 119).
To this end, the Conservative’s approach to ethnic outreach was “premised on forging
alliances and targeting their policy agenda at key demographics” (Tolley, 2018, 122). Moreover,
the government targeted its policy agenda to include initiatives that would be attractive to
ethnocultural communities thought to have “natural Conservative leanings”; however, it is
believed that these communities were used instrumentally and pandered in order to gain ethnic
support without alienating their core members (Tolley, 2018, 122). The 2015 election showcased
the party’s commitment to ethnic outreach as their proposed ban on the niqab — which was
opposed by both the Liberal Party and New Democratic Party—was part of their undoing (Tolley,
2018, 122).

4.1(a) Liberal Ethnic Targeting
The 2015 Canadian federal election ended the near decade of Conservative power in Ottawa as
calls for change resulted in Justin Trudeau’s Liberals earning a majority government. As the last
section highlighted how the Conservatives were able to conquer the votes of communities that had
been inherent to the Liberal’s base for a while, this section will analyze how the Liberal Party of
Canada targeted ethnocultural communities in the elections up to and following the 2015 federal
election. The Liberal Party of Canada has historically been able to attract minority communities
and has relied on these votes for decades (Globe and Mail, 2017). However, with the Conservatives
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attracting more immigrant and minority voters in the early 2000s, the Liberal party was inspired
to develop similar ethnic outreach strategies (Tolley, 2018, 112-113). As a result, it was not a
coincidence that after declaring his run for Liberal leadership Justin Trudeau's first stops were in
Richmond, BC and Mississauga, Ontario, two cities with heavy immigrant populations and ridings
that were once Liberal but had been conquered by the Conservatives (Castonguay, 2013, 2). This
section will now proceed to review the Liberal Party manifestos from the 2008-2019 Canadian
federal elections by specifically analyzing their foreign policy positions related to immigration,
trade, and political issues abroad as the party worked to maintain and recapture the support of
ethnocultural communities.
(1) Immigration
The first avenue by which the Liberal Party of Canada appealed to ethnic voters was
through their immigration policy. As made evident thus far, the Liberal Party had notoriously been
supported by new Canadians and immigrant voters. Jiyoon Kim and Andrea Perrella highlight this
in their paper “Beyond the Liberal Party: Immigrant Voting Behavior in Canada” noting that:
partisan affiliation of immigrants with the Liberal party has been widely accepted (Blais et
al. 2002; Blais 2005); According to the Canadian Election Study of 2006, about 50 percent
of foreign-born immigrants voted for the Liberal party (Kim & Perrella, 2008, 1).
However, this is not a blanket statement for all immigrant voters, as immigrant support for the
Liberal party is mainly from visibly minority immigrants (Kim & Perrella, 2008, 1). Kim and
Perrella present two reasons for this occurrence:
First, the Liberal party is perceived as being on “our-side” by non-European immigrants
on issues that matter to them greatly, but issues that matter only to a limited extent to other
immigrant groups. Second, different levels of re-socialization and re-politicization lead
them to different voting behavior. If the Liberal party is an “incumbent” for those who are
yet to be socialized and not familiar with Canadian politics, more socialized and politicized
immigrants should consider a wider array of options (Kim & Perrella, 2008, 2).

pg. 37

To this end, the idea that an immigrant voting bloc in Canada exists is not accurate as there appears
significant variations in vote choice based on an immigrants country of origin, with those from
Northern Europe being more likely to cast their ballots for the Conservatives, whereas nonEuropean immigrants often favoured the Liberals in the early 2000s (Kim & Perrella, 5).
Moreover, an immigrant group's loyalty is influenced by its intra-group identity. As a result, nonEuropean immigrants might tend to support the Liberals more as they regard the party to be more
compassionate towards their members as the Conservatives under Diefenbaker garnished the
reputation as being less tolerant of immigrants not from Britain (Kim & Perrella, 2008, 5). The
Liberals were able to capitalize on this and, in turn, market themselves as being more open to
immigration (Kim & Perrella, 2008, 5). Liberal immigration policy from 2008-2019 maintained
this appeal to immigrant voters with commitments to inclusiveness, pathways to citizenship, and
improving the determination process.
1. 2008 Liberal Manifesto: Richer, Fairer, Greener An Action Plan For The 21st
Century
•

A Liberal government will revamp Canada’s immigration points system to give greater
weight to skilled trades, to better align our immigration policy to the needs of the labour
market. We will create In-Canada Fast Track – a new program to allow temporary
workers, international students and live-in caregivers to apply for permanent residence
within Canada, as well as increase the number of landed immigrants into our country
consistent with our “immigrant success strategy.” (46-47).
2. 2011 Liberal Manifesto: Your Family. Your Future. Your Canada

•

Immigration has been central to the Canadian experience throughout our history.
Immigrant stories are Canadian stories, woven into the fabric of our identity. Liberals
understand that our immigration and refugee system often fails to meet expectations for
efficiency and fairness. That is why a new Liberal government will make fixing the
immigration and refugee determination processes a top priority. Waiting times are too
often unacceptably long, information and communication inadequate, and procedures
confusing and inefficient. These services are too important to leave them in disrepair.
We will consult with new Canadians, immigration stakeholders and experts to
develop solutions. (60)
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•

Family reunification must remain a crucial part of Canada’s immigration policy. After
five years of reductions in family class immigration under the Harper government,
Liberals will restore balance by increasing family class visas. (61)
3. 2015 Liberal Manifesto: A New Plan for a Stronger Middle Class

•

•

•

•
•

Canada’s story is the story of immigration. Those who choose to make Canada their new
home bring with them their unique cultures, languages, and an entrepreneurial spirit that
strengthens our economy. We need a new plan for our immigration system that is
grounded in compassion and economic opportunity for all. (62)
Immigration has always been an important part of Canada’s economic growth, but over the
past decade, Stephen Harper has turned his back on welcoming those who want to
contribute to our country’s success. (62-63)
o We will take immediate steps to reopen Canada’s doors, and will make
reuniting families a top priority.
o We will immediately double the number of applications allowed for parents and
grandparents, to 10,000 each year.
o We will also nearly double the budget for processing family class sponsorship.
Wait times will come down – which currently average almost four years for
parent and grandparent applications.
o We will provide more opportunities for applicants who have Canadian siblings
by giving additional points under the Express Entry system, and we will restore
the maximum age for dependents to 22 from 19, to allow more Canadians to
bring their children to Canada.
o We will also grant immediate permanent residency to new spouses entering
Canada, eliminating the two-year waiting period.
We will welcome more refugees from Syria to Canada, and offer more help to those
providing aid in the region. (64)
o Canadians have been deeply moved by the suffering of refugees in Syria and
the surrounding region. Canada has a strong history of helping those in need,
from Hungarian refugees in the 1950s to Ismaili Muslim refugees in the 1970s
to those fleeing South East Asia by boat in the 1970s and 1980s.
o Many Canadians have already offered to help those fleeing Syria, and it is time
for the federal government to offer more help, too. We have a responsibility to
expand our refugee targets and give more victims of war a safe haven in
Canada.
o To that end, we will expand Canada’s intake of refugees from Syria by 25,000
through immediate government sponsorship. We will also work with private
sponsors to accept even more. To do this, we will invest $250 million, including
$100 million this fiscal year, to increase refugee processing, as well as
sponsorship and settlement services capacity in Canada.
We will restore Canada’s reputation and help more people in need through a program
that is safe, secure, and humane. (65)
Canada once welcomed refugees openly, but that proud history has faded after a decade of
mismanagement under Stephen Harper. We will renew and expand our commitment to
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helping resettle more refugees, and deliver a refugee program that is safe, secure, and
humane. We will:
o fully restore the Interim Federal Health Program that provides limited and
temporary health benefits to refugees and refugee claimants;
o establish an expert human rights panel to determine designated countries of
origin, and provide a right to appeal refugee decisions for citizens from these
countries; and
o appoint individuals with appropriate subject-matter expertise to Canada’s
Immigration and Refugee Board.
4. 2019 Liberal Manifesto: Forward: A Real Plan for the Middle Class
•

•

Canada’s story is the story of immigrants – of people who came here seeking a better life
for themselves and their families – and of the people who welcomed them. Together, we
have helped to grow our economy, build strong communities, create good jobs, and make
Canada the best place in the world to call home. (74)
A More Affordable Path to Citizenship (75)
o We will make applying for Canadian citizenship free for permanent residents.
o With the right supports, immigrants are able to get to work, help build up our
communities, and grow our local economies in short order. But arriving in
Canada is just the first step on a long journey to citizenship.
o Becoming a citizen allows new immigrants to fully participate in Canadian
society, and the process of granting citizenship is a government service, not
something that should be paid for with a user fee. To make citizenship more
affordable, we will make the application process free for those who have
fulfilled the requirements needed to obtain it.
From these policy proposals, we see the Liberals display an ethnic outreach strategy that

appeals to immigrants by supporting immigrants and recognizing that increasing immigration into
the fabric of Canadian society draws support from immigrant populations. Alisa Henderson offers
support for the view that immigrants might be more likely to support the Liberals due to the party's
acceptance of immigration however additionally notes that Immigrant voters are regarded as ideal
citizens in terms of their voting habits as they are more likely to be influenced by ideology
(Henderson, 2005, 57). In contrast, Canadian-born voters often base their decisions around
satisfaction with democracy, and as a result, immigrant voters conform to the notion of “ideal
citizenship in classical democratic theory” (Henderson, 2005, 59-60). To this end, the Liberals
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appeal to immigrant voters by establishing a foreign policy agenda committed to increased
immigration.
This was most apparent in 2015, as the Syrian refugee crisis emerged as a central campaign
topic.15 The debate between the parties turned this into a high-profile election issue, with Trudeau
and the Liberals disagreeing with Prime Minister Harper’s view that military action was the best
course forward (Nossal, 2018, 42). Instead, Trudeau upheld his established opinion from 2013,
maintaining that a more open and generous policy toward Syrian refugees was needed, and as a
result, the Liberals enacted their promise to adopt 25,000 Syrian refugees (Nossal, 2018, 42-43).
It might not be clear if the acceptance of 25,000 refugees was targeted toward immigrants and
minority Canadians, however, this Foreign Policy initiative demonstrates the Liberal Party's
commitment to inclusiveness and openness within the Canadian state. Nonetheless, what is clear
is that the results of the 2015 federal election indicate that the belief that immigrant voters are now
Conservative voters was premature, as many racial minority voters remained Liberal (Tolley,
2018, 103-104).
(2) Trade
The next avenue through which the Liberal party has incorporated ethnocultural
communities into their policy objectives is through trade. Similar to the Conservatives, we see the
Liberals specifically focus on expanding trade towards the Asian pacific throughout their 20082019 campaign manifestos:
1. 2008 Liberal Manifesto: Richer, Fairer, Greener An Action Plan For The 21st Century:
15

The Syrian refugee crisis of 2015 was initially not an issue in the Canadian election campaign. On 2 September,
however, news outlets around the world published a photograph of the lifeless body of Alan Kurdi, a three-year old
Syrian boy, drowned on a Turkish beach. The Kurdi family had been trying to flee to Greece from the Syrian civil
war when their overloaded inflatable boat capsized. Alan, his mother, and his brother drowned. While that powerful
image of Alan Kurdi had a transformative impact on the refugee crisis globally, it had particular resonance in
Canada when it was discovered that the Kurdis were eventually trying to join Alan’s aunt in Coquitlam, British
Columbia (Nossal, 2018, 41).
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•

We will also strengthen our ties to the broader Asian market, investing in infrastructure
such as the Pacific Gateway, and in additional measures and initiatives to increase our
presence in Asia, and particularly in India. A Liberal government will establish a CanadaSouth Asia Trade Foundation with an initial endowment of $40 million. This foundation
will be similar to the Asia Pacific Foundation and will focus exclusively on developing
trade and foreign policy strategies to strengthen our ties with South Asia. (59)
2. 2011 Liberal Manifesto: Your Family. Your Future. Your Canada

•

Global Network Agreements with China and India: Canada is an Asia-Pacific nation, and
yet we are the only member of NAFTA without a trade agreement with an Asian country.
We have to take action to deepen relationships with the major emerging economies that
are shaping the future. A Liberal government will pursue new bilateral agreements with
China, India, and other emerging powers. A new model is needed to reflect how the
world works today. Boosting trade will be a major part of new “Global Network
Agreements”, but they will go far beyond exports and imports. (77)
3. 2015 Liberal Manifesto: A New Plan for a Stronger Middle Class

•

Properly negotiated and implemented, free trade agreements are good for the Canadian
economy. We will carefully consider all trade opportunities currently open to Canada,
and explore deeper trade relationships with emerging and established markets, including
China and India. (67)
4. 2019 Liberal Manifesto: Forward: A Real Plan for the Middle Class

•

Trade is essential to Canada’s economic success. It gives Canadian businesses access to
new markets and new customers and creates good, middle class jobs – jobs that pay better
wages, help families make ends meet, and build strong communities. We will make it
easier to trade here at home, and around the world. (26)

There is reason to believe that these trade expansions occurred due to the number of links between
Canada and members of the Asia Pacific. Initially, the ties were people-to-people links with Indian
and Chinese workers from the old rushes, in the forestry industry, and on the transcontinental
railway (Nossal, 2018, 365). However, contemporary ties have increased in importance with a
significant portion of Canadian trade and investment placed in Asian markets, in addition to
maintaining several people-to-people links as Canada remains a destination of choice for many

pg. 42

(im)migrants from the Asian Pacific (Nossal, 2018, 366).16 The people-to-people links remain
important, with census data from 2016 reporting that 4.3 million of the 35.1 million Canadians
enumerated had ethnic origins in the Asia Pacific, with most being from China and the Indian
subcontinent (Nossal, 2018, 366).17 In addition, the Liberal’s victory in the 2015 election brought
a modest change in China policy as the government signalled that it was committed to resetting
the Canada–China relationship (Nossal, 2018, 370). Again, it remains to be questioned whether
the Liberals pursued these extended partnerships to attract votes from the ethnic individuals that
represent these communities within Canada, however, these policy positions clearly target regions
that make up a significant portion of the Canadian ethnocultural community.
(3) Political Stances
The third avenue of ethnic targeting in the Liberal’s foreign policy agenda considers
political stances the party made concerning political issues abroad. Compared with the
Conservative’s position on these issues, there remains a degree of similarity in addition to attempts
to forge new paths forward. In 2015, for example, we see the Liberal party maintain a willingness
to commit military support to Eastern Europe:
1. 2015 Liberal Manifesto: A New Plan for a Stronger Middle Class
•

We will remain fully committed to Canada’s existing military contributions in
Central and Eastern Europe.
o This includes Canada’s participation in NATO assurance measures in Central and
Eastern Europe (Operation REASSURANCE) and the multinational training
mission in Ukraine (Operation UNIFIER). (71)

16

By 2016, Canada was exporting C$51.7 billion to the countries of the Asia Pacific and importing C$119.9. By
2016, foreign direct investment (FDI) ties had grown significantly: inward FDI from Asia amounted to C$74.8
billion, a massive hundred-fold increase from 1980, when it was just C$730 million. Outward FDI in 2016 was
C$66.4 billion, a substantial increase from 1980, when it was C$1.6 billion (Nossal, 2018, 366)
17
Other links have been created by foreign students: of the 494,525international students at all levels of study in
Canada in 2018, some 40 percent are from Asia, with China accounting for 28percent of all international students.
Moreover, given that a majority of foreign students from the Asia Pacific say that they intend to remain in Canada
following their studies, foreign student enrolments have longer-term implications for trans-Pacific links (Nossal,
2018, 366).
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Upon election, Trudeau’s liberals committed to this promise and in 2017, the government extended
its military training to Ukraine for two additional years (Nossal, 38). Despite this agreement
between the two parties on a policy position, the motives seemed to differ as former Liberal leader
and Foreign Affairs Minister Stéphane Dion suggested that Canada gains more by engaging with
Russia than shunning them as the Conservative government had (Wyld, 2016). Dion held the
position that Canadian support for Ukraine could continue while renewing relations with Moscow
as it is in Canada’s best interest to do so (Wyld, 2016):
Somebody will have to explain to me in what way it is helping Ukraine that Canada has
not engaged Russia about the Arctic. Canada and Russia are neighbours, he said. If we
don’t engage in Russia, we don’t help Ukraine (and) we don’t help Canada or Canada’s
interests - Stéphane Dion (Wyld, 2016).
To this end, further investigation into the Liberal's diplomatic relations with foreign countries
reveals further divergence from the Conservative party:
2. 2011 Liberal Manifesto: Your Family. Your Future. Your Canada
•
•
•

Liberals believe in a two-state solution and that true regional stability can only happen
when a safe, secure and democratic Israel exists in peace beside a viable, secure and
democratic Palestinian state. (82)
On the ground, Canada has played a constructive role assisting Palestinian authorities
with governance and policing capacity, and must continue doing so. We should facilitate
dialogue between Israel, the Arab world and Palestinian leadership. (82)
Iran is the major threat to peace in the region, and Canada should be forthright in
condemning its menacing rhetoric, and should support international efforts to prevent
Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. (82)

The Liberal under Michael Ignatieff demonstrates a position favouring a democratic solution
between the two middle eastern entities, further promoting its intent to hold Iran accountable.
However, as leadership within the party transferred to Trudeau in 2013 and Dion became Foreign
Affairs Minister, the tune towards Iran changed as Dion promised to restore relations with the
Islamic republic (Wyld, 2016). Furthermore, Dion’s reasoning for lifting sanctions appears to be
very clear as he is on record saying, “it will hurt Canadian industry [and] the Canadian citizens
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that have families in Iran…What is the rationale to do that” (Wyld, 2016). To this end, the Liberals
appear to be strongly diplomatic in their political stances while also considering how certain
attitudes might affect ethnic Canadians with personal ties towards situations abroad.

4.2 Chapter Conclusion:
This chapter investigated the Conservative and Liberal Parties of Canada approaches to ethnic
outreach from 2008-2019. Reviewing the parties’ positions on immigration, trade, and political
stances abroad allowed for comparing how the parties structure their foreign policy agenda to
target ethnic voters. In doing so, it becomes apparent that the Conservatives were more explicit in
their ethnic targeting than the Liberal party has been as the Conservatives developed robust ethnic
outreach campaigns spearheaded by Minister Kenney to attract ethnic voters they believed to have
‘natural conservative leanings.’ These outreach campaigns and targeted policy proposals are
largely considered to be instrumental in granting the Conservatives a majority government in 2011.
However, they are also thought to be what led to their downfall as accusations of “pandering”
towards ethnocultural communities question the party’s commitments towards the policies they
present. Nonetheless, there is no ethnic outreach ‘champion’, but what is clear is that both the
Conservative and Liberal Parties of Canada constructed foreign policy positions that targeted
ethnic communities inherent to Canadian society.

Chapter Five: Contemporary Comparisons
5.1 2021 Campaign Comparisons
The previous chapter outlined Canadian parties’ commitments to ethnic targeting throughout four
election cycles. Ethnic outreach was revealed to be a significant factor in both the Conservative’s
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and Liberal’s electoral strategies. This chapter will continue into this investigation, analyzing how
ethnic targeting through foreign policy was present during the 2021 Canadian federal election. The
2021 election was unique in that it was called only two years after the previous federal election
and took place during the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, topics related to immigration, trade,
and other foreign affairs held their importance throughout the campaign, and because of that, this
chapter will review how both the Conservative and Liberal parties approached these topics in their
campaign:
(1) Immigration:
2021 Conservative Manifesto: Canada’s Recovery Plan:
• Diefenbaker was a lawyer who was passionate about human rights. He introduced
Canada’s first law protecting human rights, the Canadian Bill of Rights. He also radically
reformed Canada’s immigration laws to substantially remove racial discrimination and
passed a law allowing Indigenous people to vote in federal elections while maintaining
their treaty status. His vision of full equality and inclusion for New Canadians needs to be
advanced in every generation. (106).
• Canada’s Conservatives are the party that ended racial discrimination in Canadian
immigration, the party that streamlined processes for refugees and persecuted minorities,
and the party that ensured that those who arrive on our shores have the greatest chance to
succeed. There will never be a circumstance in which Canada’s Conservatives will fail to
stand beside Canadian immigrants. There will never be a time when the immeasurable
contributions of newcomers to our national life will be forsaken. (125)
• To secure Canada’s future and restore Canada as the model immigration system for the
world, we need to rebuild a robust immigration system that:
o Welcomes the best and brightest from around the world to fill critical gaps and
robustly grow our economy.
o Offers refuge to heroic human rights defenders and those fleeing persecution who
would enrich our national life.
o Strengthens Canadian families by uniting them with their loved ones. (125)
• Canada’s Conservatives recognize the essential interconnectedness of a well-ordered
asylum system focused on the most vulnerable, an effective immigration enforcement
system, and enabling Canadians to invite friends and family to visit for important
occasions. We will work to fix these problems by:
o Increasing the capacity of the Immigration and Refugee Board to hear asylum
claims without delay.
o Strengthening integrity and enforcement overall.
o Exploring mechanisms to pursue a more generous and fairer visa system for
visitors by including more enforceable commitments to abide by the terms of their
visitor visa.
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2021 Liberal Manifesto: Forward For Everyone:
Strengthening Family Reunification and Reducing Processing Times (36)
•
We have worked hard to reverse damaging Conservative policies that led to delays and
deep cuts to immigration levels. We know immigration is important for economic growth
and have worked to increase immigration levels, reduce wait times, and build a fairer
system.
•
Many people leave their families behind to build a better future in Canada, in hopes that
they can be re-united in Canada. But the wait is difficult and COVID-19 has caused
further delays.
•
A re-elected Liberal government will:
o Reduce processing times that have been impacted by COVID-19 to under 12
months.
o Introduce electronic applications for family reunification.
o Implement a program to issue visas to spouses and children abroad while they wait
for the processing of their permanent residency application
(2) Trade
2021 Conservative Manifesto: Canada’s Recovery Plan:
• Increasing trade with free nations: Canada is a trading nation. Millions of jobs depend on
trade. We need to pursue new trade deals - but we must focus on countries that share our
values and treat workers with respect. (18)
• Canada’s Conservatives believe in the importance of trade agreements to open export
markets and create jobs, but we also believe that trade agreements must also respect the
interests of Canadian workers and our country’s commitment to human rights, the rule of
law, protection of the environment, and respect for Indigenous Peoples.
• We do not promote free trade for the sake of free trade but instead believe in engaging
international markets to create Canadian jobs, investment, and strategic partnerships.
• We will negotiate new agreements with free countries that safeguard workers’ rights and
the environment, rebalancing our trade priorities away from countries like China and
towards the Indo-Pacific and Africa. (30)
• Canada and India share strong, historical bilateral relations. Canada is home to a large
and vibrant multi-ethnic and multi-religious Indo-Canadian community over a million
strong. Canada’s Conservatives will repair and restore ambition in Canada’s relationship
with India by:
o Resuming free trade talks started under the previous Conservative government and
derailed by Trudeau, and concurrently pursuing an investment treaty, to expand upon
Canada’s strengths as one of the world’s largest investors in India. (108).
2021 Liberal Manifesto: Forward For Everyone:
•
Launch a new comprehensive Asia-Pacific strategy to deepen diplomatic, economic, and
defence partnerships in the region, including by negotiating new bilateral trade
agreements, expanding FIPAs, and building stronger economic linkages (66).
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•

Develop a strategy for economic cooperation across Africa, including support for the
African Continental Free Trade Agreement, facilitation of increased infrastructure
investment, and expanding partnerships in research and innovation (66).
(3) Political Stances

2021 Conservative Manifesto: Canada’s Recovery Plan:
• The Iranian regime has supported Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, Hezbollah in
Lebanon, and the Houthi rebellion in Yemen, and Hamas in Gaza, creating the world’s
worst conflict-driven humanitarian disasters. Despite this, Justin Trudeau has failed to
hold the Iranian regime accountable
• Canada’s Conservatives will always support Israel’s existence as a sovereign democratic
Jewish state with the right to self-determination and to live in peace and security. . To
enhance the bilateral relationship and support Israel in the region, Canada’s
Conservatives will:
o Set clear objectives to enhance economic, political, and security cooperation to
benefit both countries.
o Recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and move the Canadian embassy to
Jerusalem.
o Return Canada to its longstanding policy of not singling out Israel for criticism at
the United Nations and international fora.
o Combat the delegitimization of Israel, including opposing the denial of the 5,000
years of indigenous Jewish history throughout the Middle East.
o Boycott Durban IV in September 2021.
o Oppose the International Criminal Court’s politicization and intrusion into
bilateral Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.
o Promote and support regional initiatives that foster peace between Israel and its
neighbours.
2021 Liberal Manifesto: Forward For Everyone:
•
Continue to help support Afghan citizens through humanitarian assistance and to work
with our allies to protect democratic and human rights, including for women, girls, and
minorities. We will continue to facilitate the safe passage and resettlement of Afghan
citizens and will increase the number of eligible refugees from 20,000 to 40,000. Many of
these individuals will be women, children and minorities fleeing the Taliban, or
individuals who supported Canada and our allies over the past two decades. As with the
Syrians who have resettled in Canada over the past five years, these individuals will
enrich our communities and make invaluable contributions to Canadian society.
From this, review of the competing parties’ foreign policy agendas, it is clear that they
focused on immigrants, Indo and Asian pacific communities through trade, along with political
stances directed towards the Middle East. Furthermore, in reviewing the parties’ commitments to
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immigration, trade, and foreign affairs some comparisons become apparent. First, with
immigration, the Conservatives present a platform that showcases their commitments to bringing
immigrants to Canada. While the Liberals present the same message, they stress the shortcomings
of the Conservative party in this area in an effort to attract votes from new Canadians to their party.
As for trade, both parties present a rhetoric of increased trade takes in the Asian-Pacific region
along with Africa, however the Conservatives make clear their intentions to derail relations with
China. Lastly, for political issues abroad the Conservatives continue with their commitments to
Israel, while the Liberals focus on the situation in Afghanistan.

These targeted directives additionally are noted to have had a powerful impact on the
election resulting in the Liberals winning their third election in a row under Trudeau. Specifically,
the Conservative party took considerable steps back in their ability to capture the ethnic vote from
new Canadians, winning only one of the 41 ridings where more than half the population is
racialized (compared to the 20 of those 41 seats won in 2011) (Platt, 2021). Leger vice-president
Andrew Enns, who did internal polling for the Conservative Party during the Harper years, said
building and maintaining Conservative support among immigrant communities has always
required a committed strategy:

(This support) is not something that comes naturally to the party, Enns said. He said the
individual effect of Kenney has taken on a bit of myth-making over the years, but it still
represents a successful larger effort by the party. It was a very deliberate task that the prime
minister set him out to accomplish, Enns said. And that hasn’t been replicated, as far as I can
see, by the party since then (Platt, 2021)
With this step back, there are those close to the party and supporters of Kenney who believe the
party ought to make its ethnic outreach strategy a top priority again. For example, Tung Chan, who
was CEO of the immigrant service agency during Kenney’s tenure as Immigration Minister,
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suggests that the Conservatives failed to institutionalize ethnic outreach after Kenney left and
furthers that the party needs support from minority communities (Platt, 2021). In addition, Chan’s
review of the Conservative platform under Erin O’Toole was very critical, especially of the fact
that the word “racism” did not appear once in their 2021 manifesto (Platt, 2021).
As for the Liberals, the party’s focus on continuing partnerships in the Asian pacific could
be a critical step for their success moving forward. Canada’s rapidly growing Indo-Canadian
population has Indians representing the largest group of new immigrants in the country (Duckwork
et al. 2021). In 2019 alone, more than 80,000 Indians made their way to Canada from India —
one-quarter of all immigrants arriving that year (Duckwork et al. 2021). From this, it makes sense
that immediately following the election in 2021, the government recruited a panel of advisers —
including academics, businesspeople, a military commander, and former Liberal and Conservative
politicians — to lead the Indo-Pacific foreign policy strategy (Nardi, 2022). The Indo-Canadian
community has long been perceived as being consistent Liberal voters however, forging stronger
relationships with the Indo-Canadian community is important now more than ever as there appears
to be a demographic skew within the community (Duckwork et al. 2021). Older voters (above 30)
favour the Liberals over the NDP by a two-to-one margin, however younger Indo-Canadians
divide their vote almost evenly between the two parties (Duckwork et al. 2021).
Additionally, a divide between first-generation Indo-Canadians (who came as immigrants)
and second-generation citizens (born and raised in Canada) is shown, with half of the firstgeneration Indo-Canadians supporting the Liberal party, compared to a third of those secondgeneration citizens born in the country (Duckwork et al. 2021). The NDP is noted as the beneficiary
of this occurrence as the emergence of Indo-Canadian leader Jagmeet Singh has made the
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community more enthusiastic about the party due to Singh’s Indian and/or Sikh roots (Duckwork
et al. 2021). However, the main reason that more Indo-Canadians do not vote NDP is the
perception that the party has little chance of forming government and that Indo-Canadians do not
want to “waste their vote” (Duckwork et al., 2021). With this, the Liberal Party of Canada has been
able to maintain a base of support amongst immigrant communities from India. Moving forward,
they might consider strengthening those relationships with their second-generation members as the
Indo-Canadian community represents a significant ethnic voting bloc.

5.2 Chapter Conclusion:
This chapter showcased the Canadian Conservative and Liberal parties’ current commitments to
ethnic targeting during the 2021 Canadian federal election. Staying consistent with previous
targeting initiatives, the parties developed foreign policy positions related to immigration, trade,
and political issues concerning Israel, Palestine, and Afghanistan. In reviewing the results of the
election, it is clear that ethnic communities had an impact on the Liberals forming government as
they were able to appeal to the sizeable Indo-Canadian immigrant community, however, what is
perhaps more glaring is the fact that the Conservative party performed poorly in areas that hold
diverse and minority populations. This failure has called into question the Conservative’s ability
to appeal to ethnocultural communities following the Harper and Kenney era and perhaps further
demonstrates the party’s positions towards minority communities during the 2015 Federal election
(such as the niqab ban) still haunts them to this day.

Part III
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and Future Directions:
In the multicultural and ethnically diverse Canadian state, ethnocultural communities emerge as
influential political players as ethnic groups can influence policymakers to develop foreign policy
commitments that meet their interests. Given this occurrence, this Major Research Paper
considered the extent foreign policy plays in ethnic outreach campaigns by Canadian political
parties. In posing this question, I made three central arguments. The first contends foreign policy
to be a major factor in ethnic group voting as these communities tend to display and develop
significant attachments to international affairs due to personal and emotional devotions. The
second position supports ethnocultural communities lobbying efforts in the policy-making process
as they have a unique understanding concerning issues abroad. While the last demonstrated that
foreign policy has played a significant role in both Conservative and Liberal ethnic outreach
campaigns, although the Conservatives have been more explicit in their efforts Nonetheless, to
unpack the research question this paper explores, I conducted a case study into the campaign
platforms of Canada's federal Conservative and Liberal parties throughout the 21st century to
investigate the extent to which these parties target ethnic communities in their foreign policy
commitments. Upon review of the literature, the foreign policy areas where ethnic communities
attempt to exert the most influence include immigration, trade, and political stances related to their
country of origin. After reviewing these commitments and their aftermath in each party’s
manifesto, two central conclusions become clear.
The first reveals that for political parties, foreign policy seems to be a significant part of
their ethnic outreach commitments as both the Conservatives and Liberals initiated policy
proposals that committed to immigrant communities, promised to expand trade with the AsianPacific region, and took clear stances towards conflicts occurring in the Middle East and Eastern
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Europe. These policies appear to be targeted toward ethnic communities that represent significant
voting blocs, thus making foreign policy an essential component of political parties’ ethnic
outreach campaigns. However, for ethnocultural communities, the impact of foreign policy
remains to be questioned. While it has been showcased that immigrant segments and specific
communities' vote choices were affected by some of the policy proposals, candidate representation
appears to be a major factor structuring ethnic group voting as forms of ethnic affinity voting
appear to be evident with Canadian ethnocultural communities.
The second conclusion drawn in this paper is that the Conservative party’s support amongst
ethnocultural and minority communities has declined drastically since its failures in the 2015
election as the party lost a significant portion of minority votes due to their positions in the 2015
campaign such as their views on the niqab ban. From this, members within the party have
suggested that the party has fumbled their approach to ethnic outreach since Kenney has left and,
as a result, motivates the question as to whether re-institutionalizing robust ethnic outreach into
the Conservative party’s platform moving forward is what the party needs to do to win a majority
again. Patrick Brown was committed to this approach with ethnic outreach initiatives structuring
his bid for the Conservative leadership; however, his disqualification may signal the party’s
commitment to abandoning ethnic outreach initiatives in their political marketing. Nevertheless,
ethnic and minority communities will always be a part of the Canadian state and moving forward,
it will be interesting to see how Canadian political parties incorporate these groups into their
political commitments.
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